On the size distribution of banks by Huberto M. Ennis




n recent years, important changes to the U.S. banking regulatory frame-
work have been introduced that were expected to affect the size distri-
bution of banks. These changes in regulation had a clear objective: to
allow for a higher degree of horizontal and vertical integration in the banking
industry. While horizontal integration takes place when different ﬁrms that
are producing the same product merge, vertical integration takes place when
ﬁrms producing certain inputs merge with the ﬁrms that use those inputs.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act was
passedinSeptember1994. Theactallowsbanksandbank-holdingcompanies
to freely establish branches across state lines. In fact, the act came as the ﬁnal
step in a long process of gradual removal of interstate branching restrictions
that took place at the state level during the late eighties and early nineties.
This new ﬂexibility in the branching regulation has opened the door to the
possibility of substantial geographical consolidation in the banking industry.
Indeed, geographical consolidation has always been one of the main channels
used to achieve horizontal integration at an industry level.
In November 1999 Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Services Modernization Act. It allows afﬁliations among banks, securities
ﬁrms, and insurance companies, removing many long-standing restrictions
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distribution of banks. Some of these effects are already apparent in the data,
andtheremaybemoretocome. Itisnotyetclearifthetransitionperiodisover.
The question of whether all banks will eventually become nationwide banks
is still very much unanswered. In other words, is there something special that
community banks do which nationwide banks cannot replicate, or are small
regional banks simply a consequence of long-lasting and strict government
regulations? Even seven years after passage of the Riegle-NealAct, there are
still 7,920 small commercial banks (with less than a billon dollars in assets)
representing95percentofthetotalnumberofbanksinthesystemandholding
20 percent of total deposits. At the same time, there are 82 banks with more
than $10 billon in assets that hold 70 percent of total deposits. These statistics
indicate that even though some very large banks have already emerged, there
are still many small banks with substantial participation in the administration
of deposits.
In this article I will present some empirical and theoretical elements that
could be used to support the view that the existence of community banks is
justiﬁed even in an unregulated environment. Although the evidence is still
preliminary, some interesting insights about the determinants of the banking
industry structure arise from the discussion and can provide guidance for
evaluating the future evolution of this important sector of the U.S. ﬁnancial
system.
The objective of the article is twofold. In Section 1, I will review stylized
facts associated with the U.S. size distribution of banks and its evolution
over the last 25 years. I will also include a brief discussion of the recent
changes in U.S. regulation. Then, in Section 2, I will review some theoretical
explanations for the coexistence of small and large banks in a competitive
unregulated system. Section 3 provides conclusions.
1. SOME STYLIZED FACTS
Review of the Regulation
The Riegle-Neal Act is the ﬁnal stage of a long process of bank branching
deregulation in the United States. In 1975, no state allowed out-of-state bank
holding companies to buy in-state banks, only 14 states permitted statewide
branching,and12statescompletelyprohibitedbranching. Theresthadpartial
restrictions (for example, in some states a bank could only open branches in
the county of its headquarters or in contiguous counties). These restrictions
date from the Banking Act of 1933. However, starting in the late 1970s
and continuing through the 1980s, all states relaxed their restrictions on both
statewide and interstate branching (see Jayaratne and Strahan [1997, Table 1]
for a list of the speciﬁc dates). Finally, in 1994 the Riegle-NealAct removed
all remaining restrictions on branching throughout the country.H. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 3
It is probably safe to say that by the mid-1970s, the shape of the size
distribution of banks fully reﬂected the effects of the branching restrictions
that had been introduced 40 years earlier. Furthermore, the movement to-
wards removing those restrictions in the 1980s surely explains the subsequent
evolution of the distribution.
In the last decade, there has been a strong trend towards higher asset
concentration in the industry.1 One way to explain this trend is to acknowl-
edge that the branching restrictions were probably highly binding while in
place. Another and perhaps more interesting explanation is that the trend to-
wards concentration appeared during a period when important technological
innovations developed. There is little doubt that technological changes like
computersandATMscanhelpexplaintheobservedincreaseinbankassetcon-
centration. In fact, the potential efﬁciency gains associated with becoming a
large high-tech bank may actually explain the political pressure for deregula-
tion (see Broaddus [1998]). Deregulation is, to some degree, an endogenous
event.
The fact that deregulation and technological innovation happened simul-
taneouslyhasmadeitdifﬁculttodisentangletheindependenteffectsofeachof
these factors on the size distribution of banks. Deregulation was a necessary
condition for concentration, but probably not a sufﬁcient one.
In 1999, the U.S. Congress passed another important piece of legisla-
tion that may strongly affect the market structure of the banking industry. The
Gramm-Leach-BlileyActcreatedanewinstitution,theﬁnancialholdingcom-
pany, and allowed this new entity to offer banking, securities, and insurance
products under one corporate roof. The law is still too recent to allow us to
evaluate its long run impact on the ﬁnancial services industry. However, two
years after the law’s enactment, there are a large number of banks that have
taken advantage of the resulting opportunities for horizontal and vertical inte-
gration. Indeed, as of July 2001, 558 ﬁnancial holding companies have been
formed and 19 of the 20 largest banks in the United States now belong to a
ﬁnancial holding company.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also has provisions intended to increase
competition and efﬁciency in the industry. Making an industry more compet-
itive and efﬁcient can change the ﬂows of entry and exit, the optimal scale of
operation, andthepossibilitiesofgrowthattheﬁrmlevel. Thesechangesmay
in turn reshape the long-run size distribution of the surviving ﬁrms. However,
it is still too early to conduct any conclusive evaluation of the actual effects of
these provisions.
1As of March 2001, there were 18 commercial banks with more than $50 billon in assets; 8
of them had more than 1,000 branches in the United States. (The largest commercial bank, Bank
of America, had more than $500 billon in assets and over 4,500 branches in the United States.)4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Thereisanotherfeatureoftheregulatoryenvironmentthatcanhaveimpor-
tantimplicationsfortheobservedsizedistributionofbanks. Iftheparticipants
in the ﬁnancial system have the perception that there exists a “too-big-to-fail”
bias in the way regulators treat large institutions, then the level of asset con-
centration in the industry will tend to be higher and the size distribution more
skewed to the right (with a disproportionately long right tail). Being a large
institution presumably increases the ability of a bank to access the implicit
subsidy associated with a too-big-to-fail policy. The existence of this type of
policy in the U.S. banking industry is the subject of an ongoing debate (see,
for example, Feldman and Rolnick [1997]). Furthermore, and most important
for this article, it seems that isolating the effects of this particular policy over
the scale of operation of banks can be a very complicated enterprise.
Data
I now will present some statistics to characterize the size distribution of com-
mercial banks in the United States and its evolution since 1976.2 I use total
assets to proxy the size of each bank, and all values are in real terms (dollars
of 1982–1984). Figure 1 presents the histogram for the bottom (smallest) 95
percent of the total number of banks in each of four years 1976, 1986, 1996,
and 2000. There is a wide range of bank sizes in each year. The distribution
has shifted substantially in the last two decades. The average size has more
than doubled (see Table 1). The density (frequency) of very small banks has
clearly diminished.
Although there is a large number of small banks, the concentration in the
industry is relatively high. Asset concentration has also increased in recent
years. In Table 1, I report a time series for the Gini Coefﬁcient of the asset
size distribution in the industry.3 The Gini Coefﬁcient is relatively stable
during the 1980s (with a value of around 0.84), but increases substantially
after 1993 (reaching 0.90 in 2000). A noteworthy observation is that the
density of midsize banks has increased. An important factor to have in mind
when interpreting this fact is that the total number of banks in the system has
been diminishing in the last decade, which means that higher densities do not
imply a larger number of banks in certain ranges of the distribution. Figure 2
presentsthehistogramsforbankswithlessthan$400millioninassets(13,452
banks in 1986 and 7,745 in 2000). There seems to be a signiﬁcant shift of the
2 The data used here are from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website
(http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/subﬁles.cfm).
3 The Gini Coefﬁcient is a measure of the degree of concentration associated with a given
distribution of assets in the industry. It would be approximately equal to one when only 1 percent
of the banks (the large banks) hold 99 percent of the assets in the industry and approximately
equal to zero when all banks are of the same size.H. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 5
Figure 1 Histogram of Bank Sizes (by TotalAssets) (I)
mass of banks towards the right end of the distribution (although the absolute
number of banks has been falling for almost all categories). In other words,
comparedwiththesizedistributionofbanks20yearsago, today’sdistribution6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Asset Concentration (I)
Year Gini Coef. Std. Dev. (Mean) Number of Banks
1976 0.82 1,828 (140) 14,419
1977 0.83 1,965 (149) 14,417
1978 0.83 2,050 (154) 14,392
1979 0.83 2,077 (153) 14,356
1980 0.83 1,998 (149) 14,426
1981 0.83 1,953 (149) 14,407
1982 0.83 1,959 (155) 14,430
1983 0.83 1,877 (160) 14,420
1984 0.83 1,854 (165) 14,388
1985 0.84 1,921 (174) 14,278
1986 0.84 1,996 (188) 14,059
1987 0.84 1,932 (190) 13,553
1988 0.85 1,889 (199) 12,982
1989 0.85 1,933 (207) 12,572
1990 0.85 1,867 (206) 12,212
1991 0.85 1,883 (209) 11,807
1992 0.84 2,017 (216) 11,363
1993 0.85 2,188 (232) 10,881
1994 0.86 2,509 (256) 10,381
1995 0.87 2,749 (282) 9,875
1996 0.88 3,318 (302) 9,465
1997 0.89 4,055 (339) 9,081
1998 0.89 4,679 (377) 8,713
1999 0.90 5,476 (395) 8,520
2000 0.90 5,861 (427) 8,252
The mean and the standard deviation are in millions of 1982–1984 dollars.
has relatively fewer small banks, and, conditional on being small, banks tend
to be larger today than in the past. It is not the case, then, that the very small
banks disappearing in large numbers are losing all their market share to the
extremely large national institutions. Intermediate-size banks are becoming
relatively more important, too. In fact, the reduction in the number of small
banks is especially concentrated on banks with less than 120 million dollars
in assets, accounting for more than 96 percent of the reduction in the number
of banks with less than 400 million (from 12,060 in 1986 to 6,558 in 2000).
However, thisshiftintherelativemassofbankscouldbeaconsequenceoftheH. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 7
Figure 2 Histogram of Bank Sizes (II)
transition process if very small banks are easier to take over and medium-size
banks are simply in transition on their way to becoming larger institutions.
Table 2 further documents the level of concentration in the industry and
its evolution over time. Again the table shows that concentration was stable
(or slightly increasing) during the eighties and the early nineties and has sig-
niﬁcantly increased in the second half of the nineties. It is striking to note that
the top 1 percent of the banks in the year 2000 own almost 70 percent of the
assets (and the top 10 percent own almost 90 percent).
Table 3 presents some measures of the skewness (or asymmetry) of the
distribution. In a symmetric distribution, the mean is located at the 50th
percentile and the ratio of the mean to the median is 1. The bigger the con-
centration of assets in a few large banks, the more skewed to the right is the
distribution. Indeed, according to the indicators in Table 3, the skewness of
the asset distribution of banks has increased substantially during the nineties.
To try to determine the effect of government branching restrictions on the
size distribution of banks, one can compare the distribution at the national
level with that of a large state like California (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise
1995). Californiahashadnorestrictionsonstatewidebranchingsincetheyear
1909. The Gini Coefﬁcient for the size distribution of banks in California was
around 0.9 for most of the eighties and nineties, and the percentile location
of the mean was around 94 percent. In summary, the concentration and the8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly














1976 55.8 78.1 15.6 21.8
1977 56.0 78.2 15.8 22.1
1978 56.8 78.7 16.4 22.7
1979 58.1 79.3 17.3 23.6
1980 58.1 79.4 17.1 23.4
1981 57.9 79.3 16.9 23.1
1982 57.3 79.2 16.8 23.2
1983 55.9 78.8 16.0 22.6
1984 55.6 79.0 16.2 23.1
1985 55.5 79.7 16.8 24.1
1986 55.4 80.1 17.2 24.8
1987 55.1 80.6 17.5 25.6
1988 54.7 81.1 18.0 26.8
1989 54.6 81.4 18.6 27.8
1990 54.1 81.3 18.2 27.3
1991 53.6 81.2 17.7 26.8
1992 54.0 81.1 17.6 26.5
1993 55.3 82.1 18.9 28.1
1994 56.7 83.5 21.2 31.2
1995 57.3 84.2 22.8 33.4
1996 60.9 85.0 25.8 36.0
1997 66.5 86.4 31.1 40.4
1998 68.0 87.2 33.8 43.4
1999 68.5 87.5 35.5 45.3
2000 70.2 88.2 38.6 48.5
skewnessofthesizedistributionofbanksinCaliforniaduringtheeightiesand
nineties was very similar to that observed today for the national numbers.4
It is worth mentioning that using California as a benchmark for compari-
son became a less meaningful exercise after the mid-nineties deregulation of
interstate branching. Indeed, in the last three or four years, changes at the na-
tional level have had some important indirect effects at the state level. Those
4 During the seventies, bank-asset concentration in California was even higher (with a Gini
































effects were not present previously because the branching restrictions made
California an isolated market.5
ThehistogramsofbanksizespresentedinFigure1resembletheprobabil-
ity distribution of a lognormal random variable. The lognormal distribution
has been important in theoretical and empirical research. One of the most
inﬂuential theories of the size distribution of ﬁrms was introduced by Robert
5 In recent years, the measures of concentration and skewness for California have suffered
large swings due to the fact that large state banks have merged with out-of-state banks and, in
the process, have changed the location of their headquarters. (For example, from 1998 to 1999
the Gini Coefﬁcient dropped from 0.92 to 0.84.)10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Gibrat in the 1930s (see Sutton [1997]). His theory delivers a precise pre-
diction for the long-run distribution of ﬁrm sizes: the lognormal distribution.
Two strong assumptions are behind this prediction: (1) the number of ﬁrms
is stationary and (2) the rate of growth of ﬁrms is given by an i.i.d. random
variable independent of ﬁrm size. If one is willing to accept these assump-
tions as providing a reasonable representation of the evolution of a particular
industry, then one can expect that the distribution of ﬁrm sizes will converge
to the lognormal distribution.6 Additionally, the lognormal distribution is a
very convenient tool for analytical work. If a variable is lognormal, then the
logarithm of that variable has a normal distribution. This means that a simple
transformation of the data allows the researcher to apply all the well-known
results associated with the normal distribution.
Because of the potential importance of lognormality, in Table 4 I perform
some preliminary tests to see how far the U.S. commercial bank data is from
delivering the lognormal distribution. The match is not very promising. The
distributionofthelogarithmofbankasset-sizeisrelativelyskewedtotheright
andhasahigherdegreeofkurtosis(fattertailsorhigher“peakedness,”orboth)
than the normal distribution. Since the number of observations for each year
is very large (around 10,000) we can safely conclude that these differences
are not associated with sampling error: the distributions are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent. However, it should be said that during the years under consideration
the industry has experienced important changes, and these calculations are
not really appropriate as a test of Gibrat’s theory (for that we would have to
somehow control for the large ﬂow of exit that took place in the industry).
Onarelatedpoint,SimonandBonini(1958)showthatﬁrm-entryassump-
tions matter for the determination of the stationary distribution. In particular,
they combine Gibrat’s ﬁrm-growth proportionality assumption with the as-
sumption that new small ﬁrms enter the industry at a constant rate, and they
showthatthelong-runsizedistributionapproachestheYuledistribution(which
has a fatter right tail than the log-normal).
2. SOME THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS
There is an extensive literature on the size distribution of business ﬁrms that
goes back to Gibrat’s work during the 1930s. The literature on the size dis-
tribution of ﬁnancial ﬁrms, however, is much smaller. In this section, I ﬁrst
6 This is actually not hard to see. Denote the size of the ﬁrm by xt and let the i.i.d. random
variable εt be a proportional rate of growth of the ﬁrm size. Then, we have that
logxt = logx0 + ε1 + ε2 + ...+ εt,
and the distribution of logxt converges to the normal distribution as t →∞ .H. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 11








1976 1.02 5.80 1.0106
1986 1.13 6.07 1.0123
1996 1.23 6.52 1.0139
2000 1.25 6.89 1.0140
Normal Distribution 0.00 3.00 1.0000
The statistic α3 = µ3/(µ2)3/2 and α4 = µ4/(µ2)2 where µi is the ith moment about the
mean, which is given by µi = (1/N)
 N
j=1(xj −µ)i (µ is the mean of the distribution
of xjs,Nis the total number of banks and xj is the asset size of bank j).
discuss in some detail one possible theory of bank size heterogeneity and then
review some complementary theories available in the literature.
Explaining the size distribution of banks is a challenging task. There is
always the possibility of extending the explanations used for business ﬁrms to
the ﬁnancial sector. Indeed, several of these theories are probably useful for
explaining some of the size heterogeneity observed in the banking industry.
But it seems that these theories will always be partial insofar as they do not
recognize that there are some special characteristics of ﬁnancial ﬁrms that act
as the essential determinants of the size distribution of banks. One of these
special characteristics is that banks play a role as information managers in the
provision of credit. In the next subsection, I present a formal model that uses
this characteristic to deliver a theory of the equilibrium heterogeneity of bank
sizes.
The more traditional theories of ﬁrm size heterogeneity are founded on
the notion of an underlying life cycle of ﬁrms.7 The idea is that ﬁrms tend to
besmallatbirth, afterwhichtheyexperiencepartiallystochasticgrowth. This
processgeneratesalevelofsizeheterogeneityinthelongrunthatisnottoofar
from the one observed in the business ﬁrm data. However, in this view, there
isnothingspecialthatsmallbanksaredoingwhichmakesthemdifferentfrom
large banks; they are just in the process of growing. This description does not
seemtobeagoodrepresentationoftheU.S.bankingindustry,inwhichthereis
a large number of small banks that are not growing substantially through time
and have no apparent intention of growing. The model presented next tries
7 See Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Ericson and Pakes (1995). These models are
modern versions of the traditional Gibrat’s theory. They endogenize the growth process of ﬁrms
and the decision of entry and exit.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
to capture this point. It represents an economy where there are two different
ways of organizing the production of information services by banks (one with
small local banks and the other with large national banks) and these two
organizational practices can coexist in equilibrium. In the second subsection,
I discuss some alternative explanations of bank size heterogeneity that, in
principle, should be taken as complementary to the formal model presented
in the ﬁrst part.
A Simple Model of the Size Distribution of Banks
I study an environment where two types of banks can coexist in equilibrium.
On one side there is a large, geographically diversiﬁed national bank, with
high leverage ratio (i.e., low bank-equity capital), and on the other side there
are several small community banks restricting operation to one geographical
area (hence not well diversiﬁed) and with lower leverage ratios.
The main motivation for the existence of banks in this model is their
abilitytomonitorthebehaviorofinvestorswithﬁnancialneeds. Severalother
possible banking functions, including mobilizing funds and pooling risks,
do not play a role in the present model. Banks can monitor investors, but
monitoring is costly and not observable by third parties. If the bank is not
well diversiﬁed, then it has to commit some of its own funds (i.e., hold some
capital) so that depositors will become conﬁdent that the bank will perform
the required monitoring activities. Because of this need for own funds, and
because there are some ﬁxed costs associated with becoming a bank, only
wealthyindividualschoosetobecomecommunitybankers. Thenationalbank,
on the other hand, is well diversiﬁed and its owner does not need to commit
his or her own funds to the operation. However, running a large institution
involves some extra operational costs. Because of the economies of scale
associated with the ﬁxed cost of setting up a bank, only one diversiﬁed bank
exists in equilibrium. Having only one national bank is an extreme situation
but of no fundamental importance for the points that I intend to illustrate with
the model. A minor extension of the model would allow for the existence of
several large banks in equilibrium (for example, by introducing managerial
ability, as in Lucas [1978]).8
The main idea underlying the model is that there are two possible ways
to provide a speciﬁc service (in this case, management of information). One
way is to run a community bank with high capital ratios and low operating
costs and the other way is to run a national bank with low capital ratios and
8Another way to generate a bounded optimal size of the diversiﬁed banks is to assume that
the average cost of monitoring, constant in the present article, is instead increasing in the size of
the bank (see Cerasi and Daltung [2000]).H. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 13
higher operating costs. Both ways can be made equally efﬁcient and hence




observed in the equilibrium with no national bank. Second, in the equilibrium
with a national bank there are fewer community banks and they tend to be
smaller in size. Some of these facts are consistent with the evolution of the
U.S. banking industry after branching deregulation (see Section 2).
I turn now to the details of the model.9 Assume that there are a large
number of different geographic (or economic) zones in the economy. There
is a continuum of risk-neutral investors living in each zone. For simplicity
I assume the population of investors in each zone has size 1. Investors are
indexed by the amount of funds they own. Let   θ ∈ [0,1] be the amount of
funds owned by investor   θ. We also assume that there is only one investor
for each level of  θ.A more general assumption would be needed to obtain a
realisticsizedistributionofbanks. Atthebeginningoftheperiod, agentshave
to invest (or store) their funds in order to have them back at the end of the
period when they will be used to pay for consumption.
Eachzonehasavailablealargenumberofriskyinvestmentprojects. Each
project is associated with an entrepreneur and, when undertaken, can either
succeed or fail. We index projects by their productivity when success occurs,
rA ∈ [1,2],andprojectsareuniformlydistributedacrossthepossiblevaluesof
rA. Successandfailureareveriﬁable,butthevalueofrA isprivateinformation
to the entrepreneur. When the project fails, the return is zero. In other words,
project rA has productivity rA when success happens. Each project is owned
by an entrepreneur that can choose to exert effort in running the project. A
project requires I units of funds to be undertaken. If the project is undertaken
with effort, the probability of success is given by pH. The probability of
success for projects undertaken with no effort is pL. We assume that pH is
greater than pL. Projects within a zone are perfectly correlated (they all fail
together) and projects in different zones are independent.10 We assume that
for a project to be undertaken with effort, it has to be monitored by a bank.
Finally, assume that only projects undertaken with effort can have a positive
net present value. Hence, the incentive compatible allocation is the unique
implementable allocation. Assume, for simplicity, that there is a given gross
9 The model shares some similarities with those used in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and
Ennis (2001).
10 In equilibrium all projects will be undertaken exerting effort. The underlying assumption
on success correlation is that projects undertaken with no effort fail when projects undertaken with
effort fail, as well as some other times (so that 1 − pL > 1 − pH). See Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997, footnote 8) for details.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 5 Notation
  θ funds owned by investor   θ
R gross safe interest rate
rA return of project rA when success
pH (pL) prob. of success with (without) effort
I size of investment projects (in amount of funds needed)
c cost of monitoring a project
κ cost of becoming a bank
δ cost of diversiﬁcation
ψ size of the community banks (number of projects monitored)
ψD size of the diversiﬁed bank
Im bank capital per project
rP interest rate on deposits (deposit interest rate)
  rA (r∗
A) interest rate on bank loans with (without) branching restrictions
  θ( θ ∗) funds owned by the smallest bank with (without) branching rest.
  total amount of monitors’ own funds
interest rate R on funds. We can think of R as the return obtained from a safe
storage technology.11
Assume monitoring is costly and not observable. Let c be the per-project
cost of monitoring. The cost c is in utility terms (it does not deplete available
funds). Any investor in the economy can choose to become a monitor. For
reasonsthatwillbecomeclearbelowwecancalleachofthesemonitorsabank.
To acquire the monitoring technology the agent has to incur a cost κ (in utility
terms). Given that an agent has incurred the cost κ, the agent can monitor
as many projects as desired as long as he or she incurs the cost c per project
being monitored. This makes the market for monitoring services perfectly
competitive. The monitor can also choose whether to handle projects in one
zoneorinalargenumberofzones.12 Assumethatthereisanextraoperational
cost δ of running an institution (bank) handling projects in more than one
zone. Then, we need to consider only two possible levels of diversiﬁcation:
the monitor either specializes in projects from one particular zone or becomes
completely diversiﬁed.
11 The following restrictions on fundamental parameters are assumed to hold: 2pL <R<
R + c/I < 2pH and pH <R+ c/I.
12 Speciﬁcally we assume that there is a continuum of different zones with total measure of
one. See Ennis (2001) for details.H. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 15
Bank Branching Restrictions
Let us consider ﬁrst the case where each monitor is exogenously restricted to
handle projects from a single zone. An agent with a monitoring technology
accepts funds from other agents and invests in projects. These external funds
availabletothemonitorcanbecalleddeposits. Ifabankonlyhandlesprojects
in one zone, then the bank fails with probability 1 − pH, the probability that
the projects in the zone fail. Let rp be the return on deposits when the bank
does not fail. By an arbitrage condition we have
pHrp = R.
This condition means that the expected rate of return on deposits in a commu-
nity bank is equal to the safe interest rate.
It is not hard to see that in equilibrium there is a threshold on the produc-
tivity of projects,  rA, such that only projects with rA ≥  rA will be undertaken.
Consequently, 2 −  rA is the total number of projects undertaken. Because
there is perfect competition in the market for monitoring services, the project
owners only pay  rAI to the bank in return for a loan of size I.For this reason
we can call  rA the loan interest rate. Let ψ be the number of projects handled
by a bank. The variable ψ is an indicator of the size of the bank. Agents
agree to deposit funds in a bank of size ψ only when the following incentive
compatibility condition is satisﬁed
−cψ + pH
 




  rAIψ− rp(I − Im)ψ
 
, (1)
where Im is the amount of own funds the bank commits per project. This
condition says that the return to the banker from monitoring the projects
must be greater than the return from not monitoring (given that depositors
believe that the bank will be monitoring). Because monitors want to handle as
manyprojectsaspossible,condition(1)holdswithequalityinequilibriumand
determines the equilibrium bank capital per project,   Im. For this reason, the
banker’s return per project must satisfy
−c + pH
 







rium. The next paragraph explains how this quantity is determined. Remem-
berthat(2−  rA)isthenumber(measure)ofprojectsundertakeninequilibrium.
Then, market clearing for the funds owned by monitors requires that
(2 −  rA)  Im =  . (2)
Thisstatesthatthenumberofprojectsfundedtimestheamountofthebanker’s
own funds invested per project equals the total amount of banker’s funds
invested. Given  , we can use expressions (1) and (2) to determine the
equilibrium values of  rA and   Im (see Figure 3).
Consider now the decision of an investor to become a bank. Note that
because of the incentive-compatibility constraint (1) for monitors, the return16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Equilibrium Loan Interest Rate
The intersection of the incentive-compatibility constraint for community banks (equation
(1)) and the market clearing condition for funds owned by monitors (equation (2)) de-
termine the equilibrium loan interest rate. The dashed locus corresponds to the shift in
equation (2) when a diversiﬁed monitor is introduced in the model. See Table 5 for
notation.





  rAI − rp(I −   Im)
  




As long as the return from becoming a bank is greater than R  Imψ (the return
from safely storing funds), the agent will choose to become a bank. Because
the return is increasing with the number of projects monitored, there is a




  ψ = R  Im  ψ. (3)
Sincetheamountoffundsbankscommittoeachproject,   Im, isuniformacross
projects, a particular value of ψ (the size of the bank) is directly associated
with a particular value of the wealth of the banker,   θ. This relationship isH. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 17





Then, given the value of   ψ that solves equation (3), there is a threshold on the
amount of funds that an agent has to own in order to become a bank. Call this
threshold  θ. All agents with  θ>   θ will become banks, and 1−  θ is the total
number of banks in each zone. The total amount of own funds invested by








1 −  θ
2 
. (5)
Substituting expressions (1) and (5) into equation (2) we obtain what can
be thought of as a demand for bank funds,   θ
d
= f d(Im).13 Equation (3)
implicitly deﬁnes a supply of bank funds. By making demand equal supply,
we can obtain the equilibrium level of  θ (see Figure 4).
Note that this equilibrium induces a size distribution of banks (monitors)
according to equation (4). These banks are all essentially the same type of
institution(communitybanks). Thesizedistributionisadirectconsequenceof
an underlying heterogeneity among bank owners (in terms of own funds) that
is exogenous to the model. In what follows we introduce some endogenous
heterogeneity.
No Bank Branching Restrictions
Consider the case when full diversiﬁcation is possible, i.e., when we do not
restrict banks to handling projects in only one zone. Fully diversiﬁed mon-
itors do not face an information problem. The proportion of failed projects
(“bad loans”) in a monitor’s portfolio is observable by third parties, and this
proportion reveals the bank’s monitoring activities.14 Anyone can become
a well-diversiﬁed monitor; no internal funds are needed. However, because
there is a ﬁxed cost δ + κ of establishing a diversiﬁed bank, economies of
scale imply that only one diversiﬁed bank will exist in equilibrium. We as-
sume contestability and hence a zero proﬁt condition must hold (see Tirole
[1988], 307). Let ψD be the number (measure) of projects handled by the
13 Note that the right-hand side of equation (2) gives us the amount of monitor funds needed
to run (2−  rA) investment projects when   Im monitors funds are needed per project to satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraints.
14 Note that diversiﬁcation is not originated on risk aversion considerations. All agents are
risk neutral in the model. See Diamond (1984) for a related result. In Diamond’s model, diver-
siﬁcation allows the economy to save on actual monitoring costs. In the model in this article,
diversiﬁcation allows the possibility of running a bank without committing internal funds. No
saving of monitoring cost goes on here.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Demand and Supply of Bank Funds
The demand (equation (2)) and supply (equation (3)) of funds owned by monitors deter-
mine the number of community banks in the economy, 1−  θ. The dashed locus represents
the shift in equation (2) when a diversiﬁed monitor is introduced in the model.








ψD − (δ + κ)= 0. (6)
This condition states that the net return per loan in the diversiﬁed bank mul-
tiplied by the size of the bank (i.e., the total number of loans in the bank) has
to equal the ﬁxed cost of setting up the diversiﬁed institution. The market
clearing condition for monitors’funds is now given by
(2 − rA − ψD)Im =  . (7)
That is, the number of projects monitored by community banks multiplied by
the amount of bank capital per loan has to equal the total amount of bankers’
funds invested. Equations (1), (3), (4), and (5) still hold in equilibrium. For
intermediatevaluesofδ awell-diversiﬁedbank(monitor)willcoexistwiththe
communitybanksinequilibrium. Fornotationalconvenience,Iuseanasterisk
to indicate the value of the variables in the equilibrium with a diversiﬁed bank
and a hat for the equilibrium with no diversiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst important result is that the well-diversiﬁed bank is also a large
bank, i.e., ψ∗
D >ψ ∗ (where ψ∗ is the size of the smallest community bank).H. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 19
Table 6 Bank Size and Capital Ratios
Asset Size 1976 1986 1996 2000
≤ 40 million 9.2 9.6 11.7 13.2
≤ 50 billion 7.5 7.6 9.7 9.7
> 50 billion 5.2 5.3 7.9 8.6
To see this, note that if we plug (3) and (6) into equation (1) (holding with







which implies that ψ∗
D/ψ∗ > 1. Diversiﬁed banks must be larger in order to
generatesufﬁcientreturnstocovertheﬁxedcost, δ, oflendingacrossdifferent
regions.
We turn now to comparing the value of some fundamental variables under
thetwopossiblecases: whendiversiﬁcationisruledoutexogenouslyandwhen
it is not. Think of this comparison as a way to improve our understanding of
the long-run implications associated with removing geographic (and possibly
other) restrictions on the level of integration in the banking industry.
The second important result is that there are fewer single zone banks
when a well-diversiﬁed bank is part of the system, i.e., 1 − θ∗ < 1 −  θ.To
see this, note that having ψD > 0 in equation (7) shifts the demand curve for
community bank funds to the right (see Figure 4), increasing the equilibrium
threshold to θ∗. It is worth noticing that the banks that are disappearing are
the smallest (those for which  θ ∈ [  θ,θ∗]). In Figure 4 we can also see that
  Im <I ∗
m. This inequality is the foundation for the following two results.
The third result is that the number of projects undertaken in equilibrium is
smaller when there is no diversiﬁed bank, i.e., 2−  rA < 2−r∗
A. This result is
a direct implication of the fact that equation (1) holds (with equality) in both
equilibria and that   Im <I ∗
m.
Finally, the fourth result is that non-diversiﬁed banks tend to become
smaller in the equilibrium with a diversiﬁed institution. From equation (4),
given a value of   θ, a non-diversiﬁed bank will hold a smaller number of
projects in the equilibrium with the larger Im, that is, in the equilibrium with
the diversiﬁed institution.
In terms of the implications for the observed size distribution of banks,
using equation (3) we can see that ψ∗ >   ψ, i.e., the smallest community bank
is larger when there is a diversiﬁed bank. When a diversiﬁed bank enters the
market,theequilibriumloaninterestrate(r∗
A)falls,reducingtheproﬁtabilityof
community banks. As a consequence, only larger community banks survive.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Fourﬁnalremarksseemrelevantatthispoint. First, notethatbyadjusting
the distribution of agents over the level of own funds  θ, one can easily match
any given size distribution of community banks. The assumption of a uni-
form distribution over  θ is convenient but is in no way necessary. Second, I
have assumed that the market for national banks is contestable. This assump-
tion allowed us not to worry about the possibility of monopoly power even
though only one national bank exists in equilibrium. Contestability has been
challenged on several grounds in the theoretical literature (see Tirole [1988],
Chapter 8). The implications of increasing bank-asset concentration on the
level of competition in the industry are of major concern to researchers and
policymakers. I abstracted from these considerations in the model, but they
are probably important and merit further study. Third, note that the model has
implications for the amount of bank capital that community and national (di-
versiﬁed) banks would hold in equilibrium. Preliminary analysis of the data
shows that, in accordance with the model, small community banks tend to
systematically hold higher capital ratios than large national banks (see Table
6). Finally, the size of business ﬁrms plays no role in the model presented
here. All investment projects are the same size and have the same ﬁnancing
requirements. Empiricalstudiestendtoﬁndthatsmallﬁrmsrelymoreheavily
on banks for their ﬁnancing needs (compared with large ﬁrms). The model
presentedhereistoosimpletobeusedtostudythislastissue. However,below
I discuss some complementary theories for which the size of business ﬁrms is
important.






example, Strahan andWeston (1996) document that the market share of small
banks in the market for loans to small ﬁrms was 35 percent in 1995. This
stylized fact can be used as a foundation for a product-differentiation theory
of the size distribution of banks.
Banksprovidedifferentiatedﬁnancialservices. Forexample,abankcould
make available standardized loans, for which the approval procedure and the
necessarymonitoringaresystematicanduniformacrossborrowers,oritcould
provide customized loan contracts to long-term clients. But, in principle, a
singlebankcouldalsoprovideboth. Someotherfactorneedstobeintroduced
to explain the different sizes of banks. One possibility is that there are some
technologicalreasonsthatmaketheprovisionofbothtypesofloansbyuniformH. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 21
size banks inefﬁcient. There are two issues related to this argument that need
explaining. First,whyarelargebanksmoreefﬁcientatprovidingstandardized
loans and, second, why are small banks more efﬁcient at relationship lending?
Theanswertotheﬁrstquestioncouldbeintheexistenceofeconomiesofscope.
Usually, standardized loans are more appropriate for large ﬁrms because the
information required for the loan is more readily available and veriﬁable. At
the same time, large ﬁrms tend to demand a wider array of products and
services from the bank. In most cases, only large banks can satisfy all those
demands efﬁciently (perhaps as a matter of being able to achieve the optimal
scale of production).
The harder question is why large institutions cannot replicate the relation-
ship lending practices of small banks. In fact, Strahan andWeston (1996) ﬁnd
that in 1995 large U.S. banks had a signiﬁcant participation rate in the market
for loans to small businesses (35 percent).15 Perhaps the question should be
rephrased in terms of the difference in bank portfolio shares of small business
loans. In 1995, small commercial and industrial loans represented only 3 per-
cent of total assets of large banks as opposed to 9 percent of small banks (see
Strahan and Weston [1996]).
One possible explanation for this difference can be found in the combina-
tion of two factors: it is harder to monitor lending decisions in large banking
organizations, and relationship loans require more discretion by loan ofﬁcers.
As a consequence of these two factors, small banks tend to be more efﬁcient
in the provision of this kind of loan. Regardless of the details, what supports
this theory is the underlying heterogeneity of business ﬁrms. Because there is
a size distribution of business ﬁrms, there is a size distribution of banks.
Thistheory,basedasitisonademandfordifferentiatedproducts,alsohas
implications for the interpretation of the recent changes in the U.S. banking
industry. In the long run, a larger share of the market for loans to small ﬁrms
will probably be held by large banks, but it is also likely that some small
banks will continue to exist (due to their relative efﬁciency in the provision
of relationship loans). Finally, it is important to highlight that, according
to this theory, the evolution of the size distribution of business ﬁrms should
directly affect the size distribution of banks. In other words, if technological
developments drive the optimal scale of most business ﬁrms to become ever
larger(Lucas1978), thentheroleofsmallbanksintheeconomywillalsotend
to decrease with time.
15 In recent years the approach of large banks to small-business lending has experienced
important changes. More and more large banks have started to adopt automated underwriting
systems based on credit scoring. This allows large banks to make small business loans on a large
scale. See Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) for an updated account of this new development.22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Corporate Governance
Issues in corporate governance of ﬁnancial institutions are potentially impor-
tant for explaining the size distribution of banks. Some authors have argued
that internal corporate governance tends to be weaker for banks than for other
types of corporations (see Prowse [1997]).16 Here I sketch one theory of bank
size that is based on these considerations. The idea is not to provide a deﬁni-
tive explanation of size heterogeneity but to illustrate how weak corporate
governance may affect bank-size dispersion.
Therearenumerousempiricalstudiesdocumentingthatrecentbankmerg-
ers do not seem to result in large efﬁciency gains (see, for example, Berger,
Demsetz, and Strahan [1999]). The traditional justiﬁcations for mergers (for
example, economies of scale and scope) have problems accounting for these
ﬁndings. Some efforts have been made to provide alternative explanations for
the tendency of banks to become large. One of these possible explanations
is based on imperfect corporate governance and uncertainty about the man-
agerial ability of bank CEOs (see Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor [1999]). This
explanation can also provide justiﬁcation for some of the bank size dispersion
observed in the data. In fact, talent heterogeneity among bank CEOs alone
could be used to induce a size distribution of banks, as in Lucas (1978). How-
ever, the corporate governance story involves information issues that were not
present in Lucas’s paper.
The main objective of the theory is to explain mergers that do not imply
efﬁciency improvements, which is not so important to the present article;
however, the theory’s prediction of some size heterogeneity among banks is
more germane. Suppose that shareholders do not know how talented the CEO
oftheirbankis,buttheywouldliketobettercompensateatalentedCEO.Since
talent is associated with a higher probability of success, the shareholders will
use the success rate of the CEO as a proxy for his or her talent. However, not
only talented CEOs are successful; some CEOs are just lucky. This brings
up a problem: Inferring who is talented is not an easy task. Suppose further
that as the bank gets bigger, it becomes harder for the CEO to just get lucky.
CEOs who perceive themselves as talented individuals will then tend to prefer
to manage large institutions (or make their institutions bigger by completing
mergers and acquisitions) because if they eventually become successful, they
will more clearly signal their ability and thereby increase their compensation.
It can be shown that in this kind of environment, CEOs will tend to generate
and manage different sizes of banks according to their perception of their own
ability (not known to them with certainty).
16 For example, government measures regulating bank takeovers, such as the need for prior
approval and other potential delays, make the possibility of takeovers a less effective mechanism
for disciplining bank managers.H. M. Ennis: Bank Size Distribution 23
An interesting extension of this theory suggests that there may be a bias
towards large organizations in the banking industry. Suppose that the more
talented CEOs tend in fact to perceive themselves as more talented (and hence
to manage large banks). Suppose also that shareholders have this information
and intend to use it in their compensation decisions. Less talented individuals
may then choose to manage large institutions just to avoid revealing that they
are actually not in the group of talented managers.17
3. CONCLUSIONS
This article provides an overview of some empirical and theoretical issues as-
sociatedwiththeexistenceofanondegeneratesizedistributionofbanksinthe
United States. I review a number of theories of bank size heterogeneity, and I
concentrateonthosetheoriesthattendtoexplainthesmall-banksphenomenon
not as a transitory situation but as the result of an explicit equilibrium choice.
This explanation seems to be in accord with the empirical facts described in
the ﬁrst part of the article. The size distribution of banks tends to be relatively
more skewed to the right than life-cycle-of-ﬁrms theories predict. In other
words, the mass of banks is highly concentrated around the range of small
asset size. The theories reviewed in this article could help explain this fact.
Butitisalsotruethat50yearsofheavyregulationinthebankingindustry,
and branching restrictions in particular, have played a major role in shaping
the size distribution of banks in the United States. Deregulation is still very
recent,anditmaywellbethatthetransitiontoanewbankingindustrystructure
is not over yet. For example, the banking system in Canada, which has never
had branching restrictions, has mainly large banks with numerous branches
across the country. The question remains, will the U.S. system converge
to the Canadian model of banking? One possibility is that the ﬁnal industry
structurewillbeinﬂuencedbyinitialconditionsevenafterthetransitionperiod
is over. For example, community banks, having existed for some time, may
have generated a demand for their services that will persist. If this is the case,
then the market structure of the U.S. banking system and the Canadian system
will continue to be different even after their regulatory frameworks have fully
converged.
17 Bliss and Rosen (2001) study the relationship between bank mergers and CEOs’ compen-
sation in a sample of megamergers that took place between 1986 and 1995. They ﬁnd signiﬁcant
evidence supporting the hypothesis that asset growth (especially via mergers) tends to increase
CEOs’ compensation. They also ﬁnd that this effect tends to motivate acquisition decisions by
CEOs. (CEOs with a higher proportion of stock-based compensation tend to be less likely to
engage in an acquisition.)24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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